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Editorial
If the legislature had been serious about
data privacy . . .
Christopher Kuner*, Fred H. Cate**, Orla Lynskey**,
Christopher Millard**, Nora Ni Loideain** and
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson**
It is approximately a year since the European Union’s
(EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
came into force, sparking an unprecedented data pri-
vacy frenzy. It has been celebrated, and it has been
feared. It has been seen as going too far, and it has
been seen as not going far enough.1 Perhaps it is a
rather safe bet to predict that the true impact—which
still remains to become crystallized—will fall some-
where in between these extremes. But one thing we al-
ready know with great certainty is that the GDPR’s
impact will be felt, indeed is being felt, far beyond the
borders of Europe.
Furthermore, law makers around the globe—from
Argentina to New Zealand, and from Kenya to
Thailand—are now busying themselves with legislative
initiatives replicating the GDPR. Consequently, this
may seem a strange time to question the sincerity of the
general will to tackle the data privacy concerns.
However, at the same time as countries around the
world engage in a data privacy law arms race with the
pursuit of higher fines, ‘rep localisation’ require-
ments,2 and excessive unnuanced jurisdictional claims,
our world continues to be data-driven. It is typically
data we contribute when we get online services for
‘free’, and in relation to most of those apps and other
online services we use for free, we—the users—are the
product, as the saying goes. This is well-known and de-
spite provisions aimed at minimizing data collection,3
we have all become used to the idea that our data are
constantly collected, frequently shared, monetized, and
regularly lost or otherwise misused. There is nothing
in the GDPR, or in any other data privacy laws, that
will change the centrality of the role that data play in
society, and our data privacy laws make no attempt at
breaking the advertisement-driven business models
that largely are responsible for creating an insatiable
appetite for data.
There are many reasons why data privacy laws fail
to protect us. There are some deeply troubling practi-
ces, such as Cambridge Analytica’s apparently inva-
sive use of data analytics for political purposes.4
Moreover, this may be just the tip of a social media
iceberg that includes structural issues that will in due
course be addressed via competition and consumer
law.5 There are also ‘accidental’ data losses; some of
them caused by negligence, some of them not, but
many of them harmful. Then there is the fact that
data privacy laws often are difficult to understand
making it difficult for those subject to the laws to en-
sure compliance.6
To address the current situation, data privacy laws
are often interpreted as frameworks that merely seek to
manage the pervasive collection and use of data. But,
as approached in the past and as now required under
the GDPR, it would of course be possible to go much
further towards actually minimizing data usage. Yet,
since the business model of many companies that pro-
vide popular ‘free’ services depends on monetizing our
* EIC.
** Editor.
1 See eg the interesting discussion by leading scholars in the Symposium
on EU Data Protection Reform we published in vol 4, Issue 4, November
2014.
2 See eg GDPR art 27 mandating that a foreign controller or processor
have a designated representative in the EU. Similar, and seemingly even
more stringent, requirements can be found elsewhere; for example, in s
36(5) of Thailand’s Draft Personal Data Protection Act of the September
2018 version.
3 See eg GDPR art 5(1).
4 <https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259371/investigation-
into-data-analytics-for-political-purposes-update.pdf> accessed 21 April
2019.
5 See eg commentaries on the intersection of these laws with data privacy
by leading scholars in the Symposium on EU Data Protection and
Competition Law we recently published in vol 8, Issue 3, August 2018.
6 Christopher Kuner and others, ‘The Language of Data Privacy Law (and
How It Differs from Reality)’ (2016) 6(4) International Data Privacy Law
259.
VC The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
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data, we cannot realistically expect to receive all the
services we value in the absence of any data collection.
Thus, aside from discussions about inadequate trans-
parency and whether the ‘price’ we pay in data is too
high for what we get in return, one option that surfaces
occasionally is for people to be able to choose to pay
for the services they desire with money instead of in
data.
Clearly, such an option cannot be aimed at elimi-
nating the collection and use of data. After all, many
services are attractive precisely because of a high de-
gree of personalization; something which many users
appear to value and which cannot be delivered with-
out data analytics. Rather what would be eliminated
under a ‘pay-with-money-not-data’ option is the
monetizing of the data—data would be used for the
service only, not for profit. Drawing a sharp distinc-
tion between data being used for the service only,
and data being used for profit will not always be easy.
However, this is by no means a problem unique to
this distinction and the law is used to working with
difficult distinctions.
Some will no doubt characterize this as a ‘pay-for-
privacy’ option and express outrage at the very notion
of paying to protect their data privacy, not least given
that data privacy is a fundamental human right.
However, the ‘pay-for-privacy’ slogan is clearly mislead-
ing. Indeed, this type of concern may be countered by
reference to the fact that the model discussed here is ac-
tually reflecting long-standing common commercial
practices—after all, it is paying with data that is a new
phenomenon and paying for a service with money that
is the traditional approach. If you do not want your
data to be used for profit when you use a private entity’s
email service, search engine or social media network,
what you would be paying for is not the protection of
your privacy, you would be paying to utilize the service
in question without consenting to the types of for-profit
data processing that are commonplace today. Thus, the
‘pay-with-money-not-data’ option shares similarities
with, or arguable is a type of, the paid-for premium
services provided by many online businesses, for exam-
ple, eliminating advertisement.
We hasten to stress that the ‘pay-with-money-not-
data’ option discussed here must never be an alterna-
tive to the conditions that data privacy laws place on
the processing of personal data. Even if a ‘pay-with-
money-not-data’ option was introduced, there would
obviously still be a need for traditional data privacy
laws.
Another concern that may be expressed is that some
of the key companies in question will never agree to
adopt a ‘pay-with-money-not-data’ option. Such a con-
cern is obviously well founded. However, where such an
option does not evolve through market pressure, the
legislator may need to step in. In fact, it may be said
that any data privacy law that is truly serious about
addressing the current situation, characterized by over-
collection and misuse of data, must include rules man-
dating the availability of a pay-with-money-not-data
option, exactly because such an option is unlikely to
emerge widely enough by market forces alone.
Numerous further questions would need to be con-
fronted if a scheme like this was to be pursued. For ex-
ample, we may ask how much would people be willing
to pay to access the relevant services while maintaining
their data privacy? And how should the price be deter-
mined? Perhaps the price businesses would be allowed
to charge should be in line with the profit they actually
make from our data? This may not be easy to calculate,
but it should not be impossible to make an estimate
that is good enough.7
Where we do not have a pay-with-money-not-data
option, we, the users, are presented with a binary choice
of either embracing the benefits offered by the service in
question and thereby accepting the monetizing of our
data or missing out on those benefits. That is not a
choice we should have to make, and often it is not a real
choice as society is structured in manner that demands
us accessing and using certain data intensive services
that currently are monetizing our data. With a pay-
with-money-not-data option, we would not have to
make such a choice.
Some will no doubt see a mandatory pay-with-
money-not-data option as an expression of a draconian
‘nanny state’ gone mad. And there are legitimate
7 Many popular online services (eg YouTube and Spotify) are available in
‘free’ (with ads) and ‘premium’ (without ads) versions. It is likely that
the monthly charge is designed primarily to offset the ‘lost’ advertising
revenue from a typical user. There are, however, usually other differences
between such free and premium services, for example, streaming quality,
amount of content available, etc, the costs of which are difficult to esti-
mate. The picture is complicated further by the fact that premium serv-
ices may still make extensive use of personal data for enhanced
personalization purposes which, indeed, is a feature that many users may
value. All of this, however, is relatively simple compared to the cost/value
analysis for a social network, such as Facebook. Attempts have been
made to estimate the opportunity cost of eliminating Facebook ads on a
hypothetical per-user basis, but the monetisation value may vary substan-
tially between users. Moreover, offering a paid-for version of a service
like Facebook may have undesirable collateral consequences, such as am-
plifying political and cultural polarisation ‘by effectively offering different
media models for the haves and have-nots’. See David Cohen, ‘Could an
Ad-Free, Subscription Version of Facebook Be a Viable Option?’ AdWeek
(New York, 7 May 2018) <https://www.adweek.com/digital/could-an-
ad-free-subscription-version-of-facebook-be-a-viable-option/> accessed
21 April 2019. See also Callum Borchers, ‘Would You Pay $18.75 for Ad-
free Facebook?, The Washington Post (14 April 2018) <https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/14/would-you-pay-18-75-for-
ad-free-facebook/?utm_term¼.e54442ae2d05> accessed 21 April 2019.
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reasons to question the viability of such a structure.
However, as several of the articles published in IDPL
have highlighted, and as many of our editorials have
sought to emphasize,8 the data (privacy) ecosystem is
undergoing tremendous change, and all options need to
be on the table.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipz006
8 See most recently: Christopher Kuner and others, ‘Expanding the
Artificial Intelligence-data Protection Debate’ (2018) 8(4) International
Data Privacy Law 289.
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